Given that David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics was rather roundly ignored by the philosophical community for some time, it is gratifying to find a discussion of it recently in the pages of this journal. Unfortunately, Abraham Stone's "Does the Bohm Theory Solve the Measurement Problem?" (1994) contains some severe misunderstandings and misstatements regarding the theory. This note is intended to set the record straight.
Stone makes two sorts of observations about Bohm's theory. One is that the particle trajectories postulated by the theory may not be unique (i.e., other trajectories, given by a different dynamics, could give the same empirical predictions). That claim will not be considered in this note. It is irrelevant to the stated subject of the paper, since the fact that other theories might solve the measurement problem in no way impeaches the capacity of Bohmian mechanics to do so. The more radical claim contained in Stone's paper is that Bohm fails to solve the problem at all. That assertion rests on a manifold of confusions. Let me briefly review the relevant background.
Since Bohm's theory posits no real collapse of the universal wave function, and since the uncollapsed universal wave function is never actually employed in making any experimental predictions, the theory faces the task of showing when, why, and how it is legitimate to ascribe wave functions to subsystems of the universe and to use those wave functions to make statistical predictions (via Born's rule). This problem is solved by the notion of the effective wave function of a subsystem. 
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better than to directly quote their paper. Suppose we isolate some set of particles in the universe as the x-system, and regard the remainder of the universe (the "environment") as the y-system. Then the universal wavefunction, which is defined over the configuration space of all the particles, can be written T(x,y) and the actual configuration of the particles as (X, Y). If, as we are assuming, all "information" in the environment is encoded in the positions of its particles, then the most the environment can ever "know" about a system, prior to measuring it, is the probability that the measurement in question will come out a certain waythe probability given by Born's rule. (op. cit., 263, boldface emphasis added)
After repeating this result again several times, Stone continues:
By now we know clearly that something is wrong. Besides the obvious questions about the physical nature of particles whose positions carry no information[!], the whole course of our argument seems to contain a basic flaw. We assumed that anything worth calling "information"-in particular, any recording of the outcome of the measurement-was stored in the configurations of the Bohm particles. But we have just proven that these configurations cannot store any information at all. (ibid., 264)
This passage contains Stone's argument that Bohm's theory does not solve the measurement problem. The obvious answer to his complaint is that no one ever showed that in Bohm's theory particle positions cannot store information about other particle positions, only that at the beginning of a measurement the positions of particles in the environment store no more information about the particles in the measured system than is reflected in the effective wave function. At the beginning of a z-spin measurement on an x-spin up electron, nothing in the environment can determine whether the incoming electron's position is such as to yield an up or down result. We get that information exactly by coupling the position of the incoming particle to the position of (say) a macroscopic pointer. The Bohmian account of such a coupling is perfectly straightforward: the dynamics, when applied to the measurement situation, implies that for certain initial electron positions the pointer will go one way, for others, another (see Albert 1992 Stone seems to think that particle positions in Bohm's theory are physically meaningless. He compares them to "imaginary points" (ibid., 265), saying that it does not much matter whether they move faster than light. But far from being imaginary, the particle positions are the heart of the theory, they specify the world as we know it. Further, without them the effective wave function cannot be defined (note the function of Y in the definition).
If the conditions for a system having an effective wave function are satisfied at some time, we in the environment cannot, at that time, know more about the positions of particles in that system than is given by its effective wave function. If we want to know more, we couple the system to a measuring device which correlates the positions of particles in the measured system to those in the measuring system. Bohm's dynamics shows how this is done, and that the measuring device will indicate different outcomes with the right (Born) probabilities (calculated from the initial effective wave function). If we want to know what happened to the measuring device (e.g., which way the pointer went), we look at it, thereby correlating positions of particles in our brains with the pointer position. If getting the state of our brain correlated with previously unknown external conditions is not getting information about the world, then nothing is.
Bohm's theory solves the measurement problem completely and without remainder.
